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THE REGULATION OP TRANSPORTATION—AIT ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Transportation regulation agencies are "backward looking.
They seek to enact legislation from actions already past in order
to prevent reocctirrences in the future • Legislative regulation of
the nation's transportation modes prohibits the interaction of
the basic economic precept, that of free competition. Regulation
of the transportation industry by the United States government
creates monopolistic situations. Regulations of the modes
denies, by law, freedom of entry and exit to entrepeneurs
,
Regulatory requirements mandate the performance of services which
are unrelated to the commercial market, yet cost the industry and
ultimately the consumer. (1:844-898, 3:398-419)
Hov/ever, regulation of commerce prevents discrimination and
enforces equality of treatment by common carriers. It enstires
that rates are just and reasonable to the using public.
Regulation ensuires that industry does not engage in ruinous
competition to the detriment of the industry, the public, and the
nation. Regulation ensures that safety standards are met by the
transport modes in serving the public.
Transportation regulatory policy efforts now tend toward
promotion of the various modes as well as recognition of their
contribution to the nation's economic and societal survival,
(2:16-19) Insuring that all trsmsportation modes survive in an

atmosphere of economic competition, while at the same time,
making sure that the public en;)oys full advantages of the




This paper will examine the historical roots of federal
regxilation of the modes of transportation within the United
States. Each mode will be discussed as well as arguments for and
against regiilation of the modes. Since rail regulation has been
the comer-stone for present day transportation regulations, it
will be used as the pivotal for comparison of the modes of motor,
water, and air. Information will be provided concerning the
background, purpose, and problems associated with attempts to
regu2ate each mode as well as a comparison of the effects of
monopoly versus competition. The purpose, strengths, and
weaknesses of the regulatory agencies will be reviev/ed, and
whether enforcement serves the purpose for which it was intended.
The objective of the dissertation is to provide the reader
with sufficient data on which to drav/ an informative conclusion
concerning the effectiveness of regulation, and what alternatives
might be available for the future.
Pipelines have not been a regulation focal point, therefore




A. THE DEVELOPMENT OP REGULATION
1, g^he Beginnings to 1897 : The basic foundation of all
social control of transportation rests on the concept of
legitimization of regulation. The act of transportation itself
is of pivotal importance to commerce and economic growth, it
has therefore been regulated since early times. History has
shown, for example, that the rules of liability relating to bills
of lading provisions were very similar today as in Christ *s time
in that a carrier has full responsibility for the safe delivery
of the goods tendered to him, (1:16)
In the 1300*3, English courts were imposing obligations on
carriers very similar to the four "common carrier obligations"
(duty to sezrve, to deliver, to charge reasonable rates, and to
avoid discrimination). These common law rulings eventually were
transformed into statute laws in the United States, (1:16)
Around these four obligations rests today's myriad transport
regulations.
Transportation regulation v/ithin the U, S, began with the
farmer- (G-ranger) dominated legislatures in the midwestem
states. The Granger actions were in response to the agricultural
depression and the economic disruption of the Civil War coupled
with overproduction of agricultural products resulting from the
Homestead Act of 1863 (large supply of agricultural products

lead to lov/er profits per unit), The State legislatures imposed
strict regulation over railroads having to do with rates charged
to farmers because of their misguided belief that the railroads*
use of rates were the cause of their economic plight,
2, 1897-1906 : Three important issues highlighted the
Granger legislation and had to be resolved: (1) Should power to
control rates rest solely in the hands of the State? (2) Should
this power to regiilate extend to corporations (or just to
individuals)? (5) Should this reguJ.atory power extend to
interstate traffic?
In 1886, the issues were resolved by the Supreme Court in the
resolution of the \/abash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railway Co, vs,
Illinois case. The decision concluded the right to regulate
commerce between several states resided in the Constitution and
was reserved to the federal government. As a result of this
separation of powers, there is a dual regulatory structure, the
State is concerned with intrastate commerce. It also decided
that control of the interstate commerce could be applied to a
corporation. (1:18)
Partially in response to the Wabash case, and partially
because of difficulties with preferences shown by the railroads
for the large shipper over the small shipper and rate rebating,
Congress established the Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887.
(1:19) The provisions of the lav/ applied only to interstate and
foreign commerce, and not to intrastate commerce. (2:224) The
Act also created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
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The ICC*s charter was primarily one of regulation of the
provisions of the act and it attempted to fimction in that role,
however, orders of the Commission were not binding on the party
tmless supported by a couirt order, (2:233) The resort to the
law courts procedure seriously weakened the effectiveness and
credibility of the Commission particularly when its orders were
overturned in coTirt,
3. 1906-1917 : The Act to Regulate Commerce (1887) was aimed
at the abuses of that time, specifically unjust and unreasonably
high rates, carrier favoritism, and discriminatoiy practices.
The Act was later amended, added to, and changed during the next
three decades, but it was the railroads which initially exploited
the public through monopolistic transportation practices, (1:19)
The Hepburn Act of 1906 went far toward re-instating the ICC
regulatory bite in the government push to eliminate the railway's
monopolistic actions. The Hepburn Act extended the Commission's
jurisdiction, expanded its authority to include pipelines, and
most importantly, empowered the Commission to prescribe maximum
rates. (2:229-230) The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 further extended
the powers of the Commission in that the ICC could now suspend
for 120 days any proposed railroad rates, during which time the
lawfulness of the proposed rate could be determined. (2:236)
4. 1Q17-1Q20 : The railroad system encountered serious
difficulties in handling full mobilization to support the United
States' entry into V/orld War I. As a result of this inability to
function effectively, the federal government took over operation
11

of the railroads late in 1917.
Even -under governmental operation, the railroad system v/as
inadequate, and ^^,5 billion of federal funds were necessary to
keep the system going. Another dimension of regulation made
itself known: the requirement for an adequate system to meet the
needs of the nation. (1:19)
It was recognized that the concept of adequacy included both
physical and financial viewpoints. The nation needed not only an
adequate railroad system, but from available data, the regulatory
structure had found rates too low and had fostered ruinous
competition, (3:412) Adequacy therefore, included an extension
of the ICC*s charter to ensiire the carriers earned a fair return
"(determined to be 6%), Additionally, the ICC was given authority
to set minimum rates as v/ell as maximum rates and mergers v/ere
allowed,
5* 1920-1933 : The railroads were returned to private
control in 1920, IXirins the same year, the Transportation Act of
1920 was passed with the dominant purpose of promoting an adequate
system of transportation in the U. S. (2:242, 278)
The federal government adopted an affirmative policy of
building up the system, but the results v/ere not remarkable,
CaiTiers did not seem overly eager to cooperate and once more the
law coiirts became the force in determining transportation policy.
Part of the problem could be laid at the door of the federal
government. In 1916, financial aid began flov;ing to highways and
all through the 1920 »s it continuedc The aid increased many-fold
12

during the early *30s as a depression-fighting maneuver, (1:19)
In 1925, federal air mail contracts to infant airlines provided a
much-needed source of income to this new transport mode,
Federal aid was commendable for purposes of promoting an
adequate transportation system, "but it changed the face of the
system. It gave "birth to competition by other modes, The
transportation market changed from monopoly to competition,
(1:19)
6, 1933 to Date ; The change in transportation from one of
monopoly by the railroads to intermodal competition with the
introduction of motor transportation, brought about the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 1 v/hich v/as incorporated into the Interstate
Commerce Act as Part II. The primary thrust of this act was to
limit entry into motor transportation by requiring certificates
of public convenience and necessity, (1:20) The proliferation
of motor carriers v/as due in part to the relative cost of
aquiring assets with which to conduct business. The rail, water,
and air modes all required substantial outlays of initial
capital in order to gain competitive ent2?y, v/hereas this was not
true of the motor mode.
In 1938, air transportation was brought under regulation by
the Civil Aeronautics Act, and a Civil Aeronautics Board v/as
created with the same basic charter as the ICC, v/ith the exception
that while the ICC was tasked to regulate rail, motor, and water
modes, the CAB was tasked not only to regulate, but to promote
the air carrier industry. Domestic water transportation was
13

regulated by the Transportation Act of 1940, The Act of 1940
also provided for a national transportation policy which
recognized the relationships "between the different modes and
their places in the transportation system of the coiintiy. All
three modes, rail, Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act; motor,
Part II, and water. Part III, had their own iiiherent advantages
and as such should be preserved, (2:266)
7, The methods of regulation; rate/earning controls, entry
controls, and service controls, have not changed in the last few
years. What has changed is society's approach to transportation,
In recent years, congressional action and various programs have
been aimed at specific transportation problems such as: (1) The
1956 National System of Interstate and Defense Highv/ays—
a
massive federal aid program to upgrade existing roads and to
build new highways. Affecting only about 1% of the roads, these
were nevertheless the most traveled and used, (2) The 1970
Ai2?port and Airv/ays Improvement Act (aimed at improving the
nation's airport system), (3) S'ederal assistance in improving
the maritime program by building new ships as a pari; of the
National Defense Reserve Pleet, (4) AMTRAK in 1970, a private
corporation set up with federal support to run passenger trains
between 14 major cities, (5) The 1974 Urban Mass Transportation
Assistance Act to help mass transit, and (6) CONRAIL in 1976 was
established to consolidate seven railroads to provide for a




All these endeavors have been, and in many respects are still
being attempted within the framework of regulation,
B. CONTROL OF RATES
In the opinion of this v/riter, the q.uestion of rate control
has been the single catalyst v;hich has brought about the complete
and detailed regulation of all common carrier obligations: duty
to serve, duty to deliver, duty to charge reasonable rates, and
duty to avoid discrimination. Rates have been involved in each
of these areas and if not directly responsible for each*s
inclusion in regulation, certainly a factor.
The question of rates and rate control gave the initial
impetus to the establishment of three agencies ajid one cabinet
post concerned with enforcement or airbitration of disputes
basically over the uses and abuses of rates:
a. The Pederal Maritime Commission whose job it is to
regulate rates of ocean carriers*
b. The Interstate Commerce Commission which regulates
interstate transportation by rail, pipeline, motor, and domestic
v/ater and rates associated v/ith interstate transportation,
c. The Civil Aeronautics Board relates to economic
regulation of air transportation.
Note: Regtilation of safety had it origins directly
related to economics. Economics (and therefore rates) had
considerable significance when associated with plant and
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equipment, pairfcicularly in the railroad's younger days. The cost
to make and keep eqiiipment operating safely was sometimes a
secondary consideration and most sensitive during the era of
"ruinous competition," As a result of inadequate profits (from
inadequate rates), equipment was not alv/ays the safest. The
federal government therefore developed and implemented mandatory
ssLfety standards.
d. Depairtment of Transportation (DOT) is a Cabinet
position whose functions are related to safety, research, and
development. It exercises extensive pov^ers concerning safe
operation over the transportation modes of rail, air, pipeline,
and highway. (2:275) The Secretary of Transportation is
primarily concerned with the development of transportation
policy, but has the right to intervene in cases before the ICC
and other regulatory bodies that involve questions of policy.
(1:275) M§st transportation policy revolves around
administration and regulation of rates, therefore there is every
reason to think that the Secretary of Transportation will, or
should, become more and more involved with rates.
The four (five including safety) common carriers' obligations
have been incorporated into regulations and have, from time to
time, been tested in the courts. The obligations to seiTve,
deliver, avoid discrimination, and provide safe operations taken
together have not raised more moral or economic questions than
that of rate control. A brief summary of the significant cases
and events surrounding the development of regulations might be in
16

order to highlight the history of rate controls:
1, The Granger Cases in 1877: such as Mimn v, Illinois,
Chicago, Burlington & Qiuncy Railroad Co, v. Iowa, and Piek v.
Chicago and the North Western Railway Co, v;ere concerned with
economic policies of public warehouses, prescribing maximum rates
on intra- and inter-state traffic. (2:219-285)
2, The Windom Report from 1874 to 1878 was a special
committee appointed by the Senate to investigate the possibility
of securing cheaper transportation between the interior of the
U, S, and the seaboards. The report reflected the view that
competition was the best regulator of rates, but competition
invariably ends in combination, and therefore was not sufficient
protection for the public,
3. The Wabash Case of 1886 held that a state could not
control rates on interstate traffic,
4. The Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887 contained six
sections all concerned with forms of rates. Section I required
all rates to be reasonable. Section II prohibited personal
discrimination ", • , directly or indirectly by any special rate,
rebate , . ,," Section III prohibited undue preference or
prejudice ", • unlawful , , , to give any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage , , ," (a form of rate preference).
Section IV prohibited long-and-short haul discrimination, ". , •
unlawful , , , to charge or receive any greater compensation in
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the aggregrate • . . for a shorter than for a longer
distance • , .," Section V prohibited pooling agreements. The
provision represented the view that enforced competition v/as the
best protection against unreasonable rates. Section VI required
the publication of rates. The act also established the ICC
whose primary function was to become the adjudicator of rates and
the disputes concerning the application of rates,
5. The Elkins Act of 1903 contained four provisions: (1)
The railv^ay corporation was to be held liable for prosecution on
account of unlawful discriminations and concessions (fo3?ms of
rates), (2) made it U2ilawful to receive rebates and concessions,
(3) departures from published rate,s became a misdemeanor, and (4)
made changes in the penalties concerning unlawful discriminations
or departures from published rates,
6. The Hepburn Act of 1906 extended the ICC jurisdiction to
the control of accessorial services (another form of rates)
furnished by the railroad, gave the ICC power to prescribe
maximum rates, increased the ICC*s control over through rates, and
required notification before rates would be changed by a carrier,
7. The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 authorized the ICC to suspend
proposed changes in rates ",
. , for a period of not exceeding
120 days , • , , " during which time it was to determine the
lawfulness of the proposed rates,
8. The Valuation Act of 1913 set up a standard for the
18

determination of the reasonableness of the general level of
railroad rates,
9. The Transportation Act of 1920 had as one of its most
iiiipoi*tant provisions an entire section devoted to rate making,
(2:243)
10. The Hoch-Smith Resolution of 1925 required the ICC, in
adjusting freight rates, to "bear in mind that commodities should
move freely. The resolution was intended to -justify rate
reductions for depressed industries,
11. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 concerned labor disputes
related to rates of pay. Rates of pay are directly related to
profits and therefore to rates charged for the movement of goods.
12. The Transportation Act of 1940 prohibited the ICC from
prescribing a rate designed to protect traffic of another tjrpe of
carrier, placed the burden of proof on the rai3j:oad in any
proceeding involving a change in rates, and released the land-
grant railroads from the obligations of carrying government
traffic at reduced rates, (2:267-269)
13. The Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948 legalized rate bureaus
through which the railroads could consider changes in rates,
(2:269)
14. The Transportation Act of 1958 provided for relief from
unduly low intrastate rates, for discontinuance of unprofitable
19

train service, and directed the ICG to observe more consistency
in allowing carriers greater freedom to meet the competition of
other modes. (2:271-274)
15. The Transportation Act of 1966 addressed the exercise of
authority over safety modes of transport, (2:278) The total
cost of operation included costs associated with the maintenance
of required safety of equipment, and is therefore indirectly
related to sufficiency of rates.
It is apparent that of the 22 historically regulated events
from 1877 through 1977, the 15 cited were either directly or
indirectly related to the question of rates and their application
and control.
Transportation regulation has developed on the assumption
that the competitive forces in the market, under the rules
applicable to the industiy in general, are inadequate to afford
the safeguards considered necessary in the public interest.
(3:492) (Therefore, to protect the public from discriminatory,
preferential, or unreasonable rates, the government has a social
obligation to enforce adequacy, thereby mandating rate control.
20

IV. PRESENTATION OP DATA
I. INDUSTRY REGULATION
A, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION REGULATION
1. RegulatorY History. Problems and Economic Factors
The year traditionally assigned as the "beginning of the
American railroad era is 1830, and during the next decade, over
2,800 miles of track were laid. Prom 1850 to 1900, railroads
expanded to over 192,000 route miles.
Crucial to this rapid development were land grants given
the railroads by the federal government. This policy was
initiated to attract private capital into railroad construction
and to increase the value of land owned by the government. (2:7)
Federal policy, however, changed in 1862, Instead of providing
land for a specific rail development in one state, the aim was to
tie together the whole nation with a transcontinental network.
This changed attitude gave even more impetus to continued
expansion by the railroad industry as the federal government
eventually gave away over 131 million acres of the public domain
In rights-of-way. (2:79)
To gather the huge capital needed to build the railroads,
the industry often practiced excesses in promotion and financing.
Overcapitalization, together with frenzied and ruinous
competition, often led to business practices ranging from the
21

inefficient to the reprehensible, (2:92) The routes where
little or no competition was encountered were charged exorbitant
rates while those user routes where competition was very keen,
rates were charged often-times "belov/ cost.
The history of regulation begins with the railroads. The
railroads had a ntunber of monopoly characteristics which made the
ordinary market competition ineffective. (2:152) Railroads were
thought to be noncompetitive since their constiruction required
huge investments in land, labor, rolling stock, and terminals.
All of these investments were irrecoverable and so expensive that
more than one locality could not be served by more than one
railroad. Thus, railroads charging monopoly rates could take
unfair advantage of the powerless shippers. Regulation, therefore^
was needed to protect the public. (7:9)
By 1875, however, most large cities in the United States
were served by more than one railroad. The initial investment
cost was behind them and they could direct their attention to
competitive pricing policies based on each railroad's own
relative variable or marginal costs. Variable costs (those costs
which tend to vary with traffic volume) do not include average
costs which are composed of the marginal plus a certain
proportion of fixed costs. Basing rates on variable rather than
average costs brought financial chaos to the industry, because
frequently the railroads failed to cover their average costs. As
long as the variable costs would be covered, the railroads
figured it woxild be to their advantage to slash rates to attract
22

as nnicli traffic as possible. This practice of charging rates
which were not based on difference in actual cost of service was
officially kaown as "discrimination." The intense political
interest which was ultimately aroused over this issue "brought
about the first regulation directed at the transportation
industry. (2:153, 3:211)
The Granger laws in 1875 were the first attempts at
economic regulation of the rail industry. Ultimately federal
regulatory legislation established an Interstate Commerce
Commission, whose job it became to act as a "watchdog" over the
rail industry's rate making efforts. Their job was to insure
rates were reasonable, were not discriminatoiy, and that no
carrier showed undue preference or prejudice to any shipper.
(3:220-225)
The myriad, multitudinous regulatory controls in
existence today are probably a far cry from that envisioned by
the legislators in 1875. Reg\ilation today touches every phase of
the railroad industry, from financial subsidy on the one hand to
minute dicttun on the other. Entry to the industry and exit from
it are fully regulated, and today, the market place has little to
do with rates to shippers.
The railroad industry is a mature industary. Much of the
equipment is aged and in need of replacement. The road bed is
badly in need of upgrading and replacement. The federal
government, with the railroads, has undertaken two financial
projects to enhance the profitability and image of the industry.
23

Both projects, Consolidated Rail Corporation (CONRAIL), and
National Rail Passenger Corporation (A14TRAK), continue to
encounter serious financial difficoilties, AMTRAK is a concerted
effort to attract rail passengers not only on a commuter "basis,
but on a tourism basis as well. The system has been plagued by
any number of difficulties, the least of which is the serious
dirth of paying passengers,
CONRAIL is an attempt to revitalize the railroad cargo-
carrying system, particularly in the north-eastern part of the
United States, It was carved out of the rail lines of Penn
Central and several other collapsed eastern rail lines. The
federal government has pumped S2,03 billion into CONRAIL, and
there is every indication that an additional $1,28 billion may be
needed if the road has any chance of suirTlving. (6:12, 7:15)
Whether or not the railroads can survive by the infusion
of larger and larger amounts of federal funds is doubtful. To
date, evidence would tend to refute the idea that federal support
will insxire economic siuTvival of what is purportedly a private
enterprise, Pederal funding has not brought about a modem
economically viable railroad system in the U, S,
Some of the advantages of the rail system over the motor,
water, and air modes relating to movement of goods are: Best
integrated system for mass transportation; serves almost all
indujstrial localities and most communities; has the ability to
accomodate nearly every type of shipment and commodity; provides
numerous and convenient terminal facilities; ability to operate
24

under inclement weather conditions; provides transit facilities
to include storage, processing, etc.; lowest cost per ton-mile
for volume sMpments with, reasonable speed; increase in tonnage
hauled does not result in corresponding increase of manpower
for hauling. The railroad system's energy use per ton-mile is
750 BTU. This compares quite favorably with 2,700 BTU per ton-
mile for motor, and 63,000 BTU for air carriers.
The disadvantages associated with the rail system
includes: Peculiarly susceptible to paralyzing congestion due
to the many bottlenecks in the railroad net; inordinately
subiject to enemy action; terminal delays slow service on short
hauls; a lack of door-to-door service on merchandise traffic and
on some carload traffic; all points are not served, and is not as
conservative as the water carriers at 500 BTU per ton-mile.
The federal government, since 1887, has economically
regulated the industry. Such regulation has not brought about an
economically profitable transport system. The factors of supply
and demand have not been allowed to work effectively, and
continued existence of non-economical routes has been mandated by
regulation and has not worked. CONRAIL, AMTRAE, and even the Bay
Area Rapid Transit (BART) Systems are examples. Competition as
such does not exist within the rail industry and will not with
current policies of propping up uneconomical methods of railroad
management through the federal treasury.
25

2. Rail ComTjetitlon vers-gs Monopoly
Competitive forces have not been allowed to work freely
within the rail industry almost since the first regulatory
endeavors in 1887 • "Grandfather" clauses have practically
insured no new entrepeneurs will test the system. Entry into the
industry is limited by regulation as well as a requirement of
continued se2r7ice to rail points which are no longer economically
profitable. Admittedly, huge initial investment capital is
required for entry and would be difficult to lure prospective
investors given the ciurrent state of the mstrket. However, there
might be incentive for investment, and therefore competition, if
the marketplace were given ah opportunity to function.
U. S. transportation policy is directed to^^rard the
survival of all cxirrent modes of transportation. Federal funding
has been legislated and provided to all modes at one time or
another on the basis that the citizens require and deserve access
to all modes. The major problem with the current policy is that
it forces the citizen to financially support a transportation
system which he may or may not use. The user in this case may
not pay the f^l cost for service. This is particularly tmxe.
with AMTRAZ, CONRAIL, and to some extent, the San Prancisco Bay
Area Rapid Transit (BART).
Whether, if economic regulatory restrictions were
removed, ruinous competition might eventuate is conjecture only.
Present regulation gusirentees the market place will not be allowed
26

to v/ork freely, therefore any economic advantages which, might or
might not accrue to the consigner is merely food for thought.
B. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION REGULATION
1, Regulatory History. Problems . and Economic Factors
Road development in the U. S. was slov/ and was limited
initially to those areas where water transportation was not
available and primarily to the Eastern Seaboard. In the early
1800*3, pressiire from two groups began to expand the road system.
The railroads wanted more land transportation to move goods from
production to depots, and farmers needed improved mobility and
access to markets and railheads. By 1915, forty-five states had
highway-aid laws throTigh the actions of road lobbyists in state
legislatures. Each state developed its own highway department,
however, ownership, maintenance, and administration of most of
the highway miles were still primarily in local hands.
The federal government continued to expand its
commitments to improve and enlarge road facilities. Congress
passed a series of acts that provided various types and degrees
of aid, mostly for new construction, but not for highway
maintenance.
In 1944, the Federal Highway Act provided the first
significant federal aid for urban highways. The act also created
another system of roads, or "Secondary Systems," consisting of
principal secondaiy and feeder roads, including farm-to-market
27

roads, rural free delivery mail, and public school bus routes,
(2:10) A "National System of Interstate Highways" was designated
and designed to connect by routes, the principal metropolitan
areas, cities, and industrial centers to serve the national
defense. Most of these routes v/ere already a part of the Federal
Aid Primsiry System or Federal Aid Secondary System. The Federal
Highway Act of 1956 assumed 90 percent of highway construction
costs for any portion of the interstate highway system.
Motor transportation differs significantly from rail
transportation in a number of ways. First, motor transportation
is ideally suited to short haul modes of operation, particularly
inter-city. Secondly, motor transportation does not reqiiire huge
initial investment in capital resoxirces, therefore entry to the
market is relatively easy, (8:141-143) Commercial trucking as
a whole, is a small-scale industry. There are numerous common
carriers operating a large number of vehicles, but there is a
much greater number of operators with a few trucks. Unlike the
railroad industry, the motor carrier industry is not
characterized by a substantial element of fixed costs,
(2; 642-651)
Additionally, motor carriers: provide service to many
communities not served by other modes, do not require elaborate
terminal facilities, furnishes door-to-door seinrice integrated
with line-haul service, do not require as extensive packing of
goods compared to water and rail modes, is very responsive to
special user requirements, allows for greater flexibility over
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water and rail, and can rapidly improvise in emergencies.
The disadvantages are that the motor carrier industry
has limited capahilities for mass transportation, as costs
manpower requirements, and fuel consumption increase directly
with increases in ton-miles. There is a serious lack of
integration and coordination among carriers with respect to
interchange of traffic not present with water and rail modes.
The industry is sujsceptible to wartime shortages of fuel, 2?ub"ber,
equipment, and personnel. The industry is less dependable than
railroads due to mechanical failures, weather, traffic
congestion, driver fatigue, and there are limitations on hulk
cargoes and overweight and outsized articles. Energy use of
2,700 BTU per ton-mile compaires favorably with the air carrier
industry of 63,000 BTU per ton-mile, but does not do well against
the 500 BTU per ton-mile for water, and 750 BTU for rail carriers,
The ease with which a prospective carrier could enter the
market r meant that the new industry qiiickly became saturated with
small trucking firms. Competition for service took on, at times,
dangerous proportions and, in some instances, physical violence.
As a result, the states first regulated the motor carrier
industry and each state enacted legislation peculiar to their own
needs. The state laws varied widely in their content and the
degree of success with which they were administered.
With the difficulties encoimtered by the individual
states attempting to regulate interstate trucking, federal
legislation enacted the Motor Carrier Act of 1955, and in 1940
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the provisions of this legislation were incorporated into Part II
of the Interstate Commerce Act, Today, states continue to have
the obligation to regulate for the protection of highways, and
the promotion of safety within their respective borders, but the
ICC regulates the economics of tke industry, (2:656-675)
Part II of the Act deals with the four types of
transportation agencies by motor vehicles: Common carriers
(service held out to the general public); contract carriers
(service contracted out to one or a limited number of users for
specific services); exempt carriers (services held out to the
general public which are exempt from rate control by the ICC);
and private carriers (company-ovmed equipment).
One of the first conceims which has continued to impact
on the administration of the motor caxrleTa* regulations is the
difference between it and the railroad regulations. Part I
(railroad), and Part II (motor-carrier), contain some wide
variances which in themselves are tantamount to discrimination
with the t2:ansportation policy as a whole. A summary of some of
these differences are as follows:
1) Railroads are almost wholly common cairiers. Motor
carriers include common, contract, exempt, and private.
2) Motor carriers are not subject to a long and short
haul clause.
3) Part II requires motor carriers to obtain insurance
or other liabilities protection—not so for railroads.
4) The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to
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prevent abandonment of operations "by a motor carrier if the
carrier wishes to discontinue operations entirely,
5) The ICO cannot control intrastate rates for motor
carriers. Part I does contain authority for the ICC to raise
intrastate rates to the level of interstate rates if the former
are so low as to constitue discrimination against interstate
commerce
,
The "(Grandfather" clause (1 June 1935), (no proof of
public convenience and necessity or of consistency with the
public interest was required under this clause) continues to
cause considerable difficulty for the ICC. The "Grandfather"
clause can easily be construed to mean discriminatory entry
restrictions for a prospective carrier. The clause, in effect,
limits entiry to the industiry, and as claimed by many
entrepeneurs
,
protects existing carriers. The requirement for a
certificate for service to be submitted and defended by a
prospective ca3?rler and the fact that he must be found "fit,
willing, and able to perform the service proposed and that such
service is required by public convenience and necessity," would
appear to justify claims of protectionism since such certificates
were not required of those in the trade when the legislation was
enacted. (7:25-26)
The large element of fixed expenses in the railroad
industry provided an explanation of the tendency for competition
among railroads to engage in "ruinous competition. Since the
element of large fixed expenses is missing from the motor-carrier
^Z'^

industry, ruinous competition would therefore not develop as it
did with railroads. However, overcapacity of the trucking
industry led to the same rate-cutting, rate wars, and
unremunerative rates as a way of attracting trade. These dubious
practices have led to myriad regulatory directives for both
economic and safety controls.
The industry today continues to suffer from overcapacity,
and rates are a constant administrative thorn in the side of the
ICC, The tendency toward overcapacity may be a resiilt of the
fact that, unlike the rail industry, the road beds have been
almost exclusively constructed from federal funding and
maintenance has been accomplished by a combination of state and
federal funds. The motor carrier industry has not had to plan,
fund, or manage the most expensive portion of their total
operations—the highways.
Current energy considerations appear to have had little
impact on the industry as a whole. As sources of fossil fuel
become more scarce, particularly sources of crude oil, the
trucking industry will face some very serious economic
difficulties. It may be that with the cost of crude oil
continuing to rise, other modes of transport may become more
attractive for some types of shippers. Also, many of the smaller
trucking companies may find they cannot survive in this very rate
competitive arena as the cost of fuel escalates.
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2. Motor MonoTDolT versus ComDetition
Hie total niim'ber of motor carriers within th.e industry in
itself mitigates against monopolies. TMs is not to say that a
monopoly cannot occur, but the chances of such an event is remote.
There is a current trend "by shippers toward the use of more
contract carriers or investment in company-owned organic assets.
Both these types of carriers are exempt from much of the ICC
regulation. The fact that a shipper may circumvent most of the
costs of administering the industry regulation is reason enough
to invest in their own assets.
The most important issue likely to impact on the concept
of competition is that of consolidation or merger. Consolidation
can, in fact could, result in improved service, or lower costs,
but the ICC has not been authorized by Congress to ignore
anti-trust laws. The courts have stated, however, that "...
the Commission is not to measure proposals for all-rail or all-
motor consolidations by the standards of the anii-trust laws."
(3:707) The Commission will have to tread a fine line betv/een
violating anti-trust laws, preserving competition between
independent cairiers, and allowing the shipper the advantages of
lower costs which may result from a consolidation.
C. WATER TRANSPORTATION REaULATION
1. Regulatory History. Problems, and Economic Factors
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Water was the main method of travel in the early United
States. Since the Eastern Seaboard contains so many bays,
harbors, and river inlets, transportation by water was almost a
natural phenomenon. Land transportation at this time in history
was both time consuming and expensive. Early water transport was
of utmost impoirtance in the development of commerce and for the
expansion of manufactiiring. Passengers traveled mostly by water,
The use of the steamship in the early 1800 »s gave added
Impetus to water transportation and with the successful
completion of the Erie Canal in 1825, extensive canal building in
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, Ohio, Indiana,
and Michigan rapidly expanded the inland waterways.
The waterways grew rapidly until the railroad industry
seriously reduced heretofore cargo destined to travel by barge,
inhere was enough interest in reviving the inland system in the
late paarb of the 19th century, that the federal goveimment
eventually assumed the construction and maintenance of all inland
waterways on the morale belief that preservation of the nation's
waterways system was in the best interest of the public.
Waterways are provided by the government to the extent
that they are not usable in their nattiral condition. The federal
government, and to a much lesser degree, the state gove2mments,
have funded the construction or improvement of water
transportation facilities. State and local governments have
funded terminal facilities to a considerable extent. (2:729)
The cost characteristics of domestic water transport are
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much the same as those of motor carriers, and for the same
reasons. Ownership of the vessels can "be separated from that of
the waterways, canals, and terminals. Shipping costs are mostly
variable, therefore the industry is highly competitive in its
structtire, (5:180) The industry is not required to invest large
sums in fixed costs to either constonict the waterways or to
maintain them,
Federal jurisdiction over control and improvement of
inland waterv/ays stems from its power to regulate interstate
commerce. Water transportation, like highway transportation, hut
unlike railroad transportation, is a mode of transportation which
is provided and maintained at public expense. Transportation
seirvice over the waterways, however, is in the hands of private
enterprise in much the same way as the motor carrier transport.
Competing carriers may operate over the same waterway which are,
for the most part, considered public ways. As with highway
transportation, there are four classes of carriers: common,
contract, exempt, and private. Services provided by each of the
classes are basically the same as those provided by the motor
carrier industry and are subject to the same regulatory controls.
(8:124-125)
The chief advocate of bringing inland water carriers under
federal regulation was the railroad industry, which had been
suffering from competition of inexpensive water carriage, V/ater
carrier regulation eventually became Part III of the Interstate
Commerce Act, and closely parallels Part II, the regulation of

motor carriers, (9:31)
Regulation of water carriers developed more slowly than
railroad regxilation and had not, to 1940, been as encompassing as
railroad regulation. Such regulation as had developed had "been
enacted to prevent the creation of overcapacity v/ithin the
industry. Overcapacity in the water carrier world led to the
same conditions as encountered in "both the railroad and motor
carrier industries: rate cutting, discrimination, and
undesirable practices.
International shipping, as opposed to coastal and
inland wateirway shipping, must be self-regulating by the
industry. No nation can effectively control the shipping of other
nations. In domestic shipping, however, direct government
control through rate regulation and certificate requirements
substitutes for self-regulation. Overcapacity, discriminatory
pricing, and other abuses have occurred within the ocean shipping
industry, and similar situations have appeared on inland
waterways. To prevent such events, regulatory action was
demanded and implemented.
The extension of regulation to water carriers to
coastwise, intercoastal, and inland waterways had an additional
purpose. Regulated carriers are reqtilred to publish their rates
and to adhere to them. If some unregulated water carriers were
allowed to be competitive with railroads, or if some water
carriers were regulated and others were not, the regulated
carriers would be at a competitive disadvantage in that the
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unregiilated carriers woTild then be free to charge whatever rates
might be c-urrent. (2:753) The same reasoning would apply to
the motor and air carriers.
Water transportation is composed of almost 93 percent
exempt carriers and are therefore not subject to ICO regulation,
Por this reason, the water mode is practically removed from the
"thick of the fray" relative to the vigorous bid for cargoes
amongst the motor and rail carriers.
3!he advantages of water transportation over other modes
is its low cost, particularly on large tonnage and long haul.
It is adaptable to almost any type cargo and has the capacity
for handling tremendous tonnages. The slowness of inland water
carriers provides a substitute for storage facilities, and the
energy use per ton-mile is the most economical of all modes of
transportation at 500 BTU,
Water carriers are normally slower than rail
transportation. This is not always the case, but for the most
part, water transpoirfcation cannot effectively vie for service on
the basis of speed. The service is seasonal in that
transportation is impossible during the winter months through the
northern parts of the country. During periods of droughts or
floods, water transportation must, of necessity, be interrupted.
When freight traffic originates at points not on the waterways, a
transfer from truck or freight cars is required if inland water
transportation is to be used. This often absorbs any lower
transportation savings which might otherwise be realized through
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use of water transportation. IClie same difficulty is encountered
if industries axe not located on the v/ater front and must haul
cargoes to and from the water\7ay. Rail and truck services can,
and do, extend to the industrial plant. Under the Harhor Act of
1893, the liability for loss and damage by water mode is not as
extensive as for the other modes. This is overcome, to some
extent, by some water carriers who provide full insurance from
their ovm resources in order to compete more effectively with
other transportation carriers.
Railroads have opposed the development of waterways
almost from the beginning. They have, from time to time, engaged
in rather nefarious practices hoping to limit that development,
such as failure to establish facilities for the interchange of
traffic with water carriers, refusal to establish through and
joint rates with the water lines, and discriminatory rate
cutting. Legislation has, for the most part, corrected these
issues, however, there remains enmity between the two
transportation modes. This may create difficulties for futxire
possibilities of innovative changes which might assist both
modes,
V/aterway advocates have encouraged further improvements
to water transportation facilities. The railroads have opposed
further expenditures for expansion of the waterway system.
The advocates of waterways argue that developing
waterways affords cheaper transportation than can be provided by
railroads. V/ater transportation is cheap on natural waterways
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"because the way is a gift of natxire. There is no capital
investment and little maintenance is reqiiired, so say the
advocates. Hov/ever, waterways are largely man-made, requiring
large investment and maintenance expenditures. Waterways are
considered a public good and as a matter of policy, have been
constructed and funded by federal expenditures. If these costs
are considered, then v/ater transportation often proves to be
more expensive than rail.
Waterways which can be expected to provide cheaper
transportation than other modes, shotild be justified and
developed regardless of the influence exerted to prevent
expansion in this direction. However, historically the real
(full) costs to operate and maintain a given waterway has never
been developed. Records have not been kept which would provide
some insight into costing of a given way. Therefore, in the
absence of any sort of reliable data, there is little likelihood
the government will entertain additional constiniction of
waterways
.
Arguments have been advanced that waterways should be
expanded to relieve the railroad congestion. While this may have
been a tenable argument in years past, currently the country *s
railroads suffer from a dirth of cargo and are burdened with
overcapacity. Rail delays are a fact of life in many instances,
although such may be a matter more of management and planning,




Lastly, arguments have been advanced that waterways should
"be expanded and developed in order to insiire railroad rates
remain competitive. Althou^ it would certainly not be tmfair to
develop a waterway and thereby force the rail rates to the level
of water rates, when the water rates cover the full cost of
service, it would smack of sheer economic folly to force
railroads to meet water rates when the latter does not cover the
ftill cost of service because then the taxpayer is paying part of
it. (2:734-757)
Another area of interest is the current energy problem.
Energy costs for the waterway user has, and will, continue to
rise as fossil fuels become more scarce. The same is true of
the other modes of transportation. Should costs continue to
increase with the development of alternative sources of energy,
water transportation may be viewed in a different context by
the shipper.
2. Inland Waterway Monopoly versus Comipetition
The principal concern in domestic water transportation
has been to protect it against competition from rai]j:oads. The
industry has not been plagued with much of the competitive
abuses such as caused long-term difficulties with the rail
carrier and, to a lesser extent, motor carriers. Competition
has prevailed to a considerable degree, since the carriers make
use of natural waterways, or waterways constructed, improved, and
maintained by the government. Common carriers can compete over

the same routes as well as compete witli contract and private
carriers. Thus the conditions for the development of a monopoly
I
~ has not been present, (2:750, 3:181) Water carriers do not have
the large fixed costs such as those integral to the railways,
therefore, the conditions for the ruinous competition which
characterized the railroads is, for the most part, absent.
Waterway transportation has been developed on the theory
that it is proper for the public to pay part of the cost of
transportation, since the benefits are so widely diffused. This
same thinking, to a considerable extent, applies also to the
motor carrier and air carrier industries. Railroads, on the
other hand, developed on the theory that the user should pay the
costs.
D. AIR TRAITSPORTATION REGULATION
1. Regulatory History. Problems, and Economic Factors
Air transport is the most recent mode of transportation
and is also the fastest growing. The first airplane flight was
made less than 75 years ago and today the industiry is a colossus
with assets far into the billions of dollars. Cuirently, the
air carrier industry transports very few commodities with the
exception of some high value cargoes. It is almost exclusively
a people mover, and probably has been the single most important
Impetus to internationalizing the planet. The industry has
transported what was once long, and many times arduous, trips
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into pleasant, relaxing jaunts of hours, and oftentimes, minutes,
(5:116-137)
Air transport requires a complicated system of aids to
flying known as tlie airway system. This system serves much the
same as the interstate highway system for the motor carrier, or
rail, or water system to the railroad industry or the inland
water carrier industry. The airway system is under the control
of the Pederal Aviation Agency, now a part of the U. S.
Department of Transportation, as is the Federal Railway Agency,
and the Highway Safety Agency.
The airway system was financed by the federal government
from 1925 through 1967 for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of the system. A first step was taken in 1961 to
develop and implement a method of taxation to affect some of
these costs by taxing aiir fare tickets. The Airport and Airway
Development Act of 1970 imposed a tax on air freight, domestic
passenger tickets, a "head tax" on overseas flights, and a
registration fee on all aircraft and aircraft fuel. The proceeds
go to an "Airway and Airport Trust Pund" to be used to finance
planning, development, construction, operation, and maintenance
of the airway system.
Airports are not owned by the federal government with the
exception of those which serve Washington D. C. (Dulles and
Washington International), but are instead owned by municipalities
or other governmental units. There are three reasons for this
development: First, benefits derived by the business interests.
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direct and indirect, have desired access to airports. Second,
federal aid had been available for financing of publicly-owned
airports, and third, airports are not ordinarily profitable
enterprises, therefore private investment is not attracted to this
type of financial consideration. This last reason has arisen
primarily because the income from landing fees, rentals, sale of
fuel and concessions is insufficient in all cases to affect costs
of operation, depreciation, and interest on investment. It
remains a matter for future development as to whether a given
community wi3J. be willing to subsidize their airport or insist it
be managed on a profitable basis, whatever difficulties that may
bring.
!Dhe CAB "certifies" route carriers and classifies them
into domestic trunk lines, local-service, helicopter, intra-
Alaska, intra-Hawaii , domestic all-cargo, and international and
territorial carriers. The most obvious advantage of air
transportation over the other modes is that of speed. The
industry possesses the ability to overcome natural obstacles
or barriers which might limit other modes or require transfer
between modes.
Some of the disadvantages are, of cotirse, the high cost,
particularly on short movements, the lack of reliability due to
weather interference, facilities deficiencies such as size and
.
location of airports and traffic control. Structural design
modifications are required to permit optimum utilization of cargo
space and lift capability of planes, therefore much of the
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so-called air freight is, in fact, limited to parcel size
shipments. Energy efficiency is the worst for all modes at
63,000 BUT per ton~mile. The air carrier economic
characteristics are exemplified "by relatively high fixed costs
and ve2:y high variable costs when compared with the other modes
of transportation.
Ihe current system of federal regulation of air
transportation was established by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 • Prior to 1938, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 provided for
the construction, maintenance and operation of the federal
airways system v/hich included research and development relating
to aeronautics. This, for the first time in the transportation
industry as a whole, marked a turning point for the general
system of federal regulation, from one of regulation of transport
modes only, to one of regulation and -promotion . To date,
however, the concept of regulatory promotion of a transportation
mode applies only to the air carrier industry, (8:149-150)
The Civil Aeronautics Act further established the Civil
Aeronautics Authority (CAA). The Authority was empowered to
determine compensation to be received by airlines for the
transportation of mail, and the Act relieved the ICC of such
powers. In 1940, the CAA was renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), concerned with the economic regulation of business?
transporting persons, property, and mail by air, (2:770-806)
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 created the Federal
Aviation Agency (FAA) which was to concern itself with functions
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related with safety and the development and implementation of
regulations administering those functions.
!l?he major differences betv/een air and rail regulation is
that the CAB may exempt any carrier or class of carriers from the
economic regulations. The ICC does not have equal authority to
make such "broad exemptions. Eie Pederal Aviation Act does not
contain any long-short haul clauses (the carrier cannot charge
more for a short haul than for a long haul; over the same line,
same distance, the shorter haul being included in the longer
haul). The CAB does not control the issuance of securities of
air carriers (to prevent development of weak capital st27uctures),
and the CAB does not have the power to award reparations to
shippers for injury resulting from the charging of unlawful
rates, (2:807)
The CAB has shown some tendency to favor the buildiiig up
or expansion of smaller air carriers in an effort to strengthen
their financial base. The Board believed its responsibilities
included a conscious effort to narrow rather than widen the
relative sizes of the bigger carriers and smaller trunk lines.
One difficulty with the attempt by the Board to cut in the weaker
lines on the more profitable lines is that the bigger carriers do
not, for obvious reasons, willingly provide room. In fact,
there is some evidence which shows that the larger carriers, from
time to time, overscheduled routes in order to make it more
difficult for the small carrier to gain entry. (2:817-818)
The CAB has had considerable difficulty in attempting to
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resolve the issue of air caiin^ier promotional rates such as
"Discover America" fares, military discount fares, youth standby
fares, and family fares. The air carriers use this advertising
technique to attract more passengers, however, other competing
passenger carriers such as hus lines have objected to these
reductions in rates as "being unjustly discriminatory. In 1970,
the CAB, after much deliberation, found the promotional fares not
unjustly discriminatory, but did require changes and limitations
in the use of fares. The issue remains close to the surface as
a source of conflict between competing modes.
The CAB is continuously involved in attempting to airive
at establishing what percentage of profit is considered a fair
rate of return. In 1971» a decision by the Board made 12 percent
for the trunk line, and 12.35 percent for locstl-seirT-ice lines the
"fair rate of retxim maximum." The issue, however, is still very
much active as the sdrlines contend that it is impossible to
established a fixed rate of return because earnings vary widely
from year to year, therefore, the fair rates of return criteria
should be established over an extended period of time. (10)
Probably the most severe criticism of air carrier
regulation is the problems surrounding market entry. Part of
that criticism has been directed at CAB policy of awarding
additional routes to existing carriers instead of ceirtifieating
new airlines. On the other hand, existing airlines have
criticized the Board for certificating too nruch competitive
service, thereby enticing the industry to overcapacity and thence
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to financial problems. (10, 11, 12)
The air carriers, of all the modes of transportation, are
the highest consumers of energy per BTU/ton-mile, therefore, any
increase in costs of fossil fuels (and there is every reason to
forsee future increases as this source of energy becomes scarcer)
will force a commensiirate increase in passenger and cargo fares.
If in fact the industiry currently suffers from overcapacity,
energy costs will have a decided effect on given carrier *s
ability to remain solvent. Ai]:y increase in fares to support
increase in energy costs will undoubtedly cause decreases in
consumer utilization, thus compounding financial stress, (10)
There is no doubt that the CAB, together with the
industry, must review the market as a whole with some consideration
given to relaxing the regulatory restrictions relative to
abandonment of unprofitable routes, pricing, and other economic
limitations. If controls to entry are removed, in all
probability overcapacity would develop, rate cutting would appear,
and earnings would likely sink belov/ a survival level.
Competition, in this instance woiild, in all likelihood, give v;ay
to some type of monopolistic control. If the subsidies to those
airlines which are unprofitable, but thought to be a public
necessity were removed, the general U. S. transportation policy
of providing transportation to the citizens at fair and reasonable
rates (however fair and reasonable may be defined), would require
a change. Competitive services between traffic points would still
be available, but air service at smaller cities, and some routes.
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would probably disappear, (11, 12)
2. Air Carrier Monopoly versus Competition
The airlines compete for customers by offering more
and more frequent flights, attractive flight
attendants, gourmet meals, free drinks, first-run
movies, and comfort. All of these increase the
airlines* cost of operation, but not their
efficiency, nor necessarily the total number of
customers,
and concerning the frequency of flights:
• , , there is evidence to support the airlines*
belief that increasing the number of flights in a
market often results in a more than proportionate
increase in passengers, according to CAB officials.
These comments were entered into the Congressional
Record, Proceeding and Debates of the 95th Congress, First
Session, by Carole Shifirh, January 18,1977, relative to
proposed legislation to deregulate the airlines industry. The
comments are strong indications that competition, as originally
envisioned by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, is not what is
happening in today's market.
The direction in which the CAB has moved in the past was
geared to developing and protecting an infant industry through
traditional public utility-type regulation such as control of
entry to the market, control over routes, atnd control of rates.
Even so, there appears to be an excess of capacity. Airlines are
currently circumventing CAB price controls through fierce service
competition, thus the circumstances of flying aircraft with half-
empty seats but loaded galleys with delicacies and fine wines.
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Current regulation has not controlled competition of this nature,
arather, regulatory control of rates may have actually caused it.
Proponents of some or all economic deregulation have suggested
that the airlines* current unhealthy financial condition may, in
fact, be caused by being protected from the clearing function of
the marketplace. (10)
The CAB maintains that from a strictly economic standpoint,
the question of whether competition or monopoly should prevail
rests on the relation between size and cost in the industry. If
unit cost declines as the volume of traffic increases, then
service can be provided at the lowest cost if one carrier is
allowed to carry all the traffic over the route. If unit costs
do not decline as volume of traffic increases, there is no
justification for excluding other carriers. The CAB*s charter
includes the doctrine of insuring competition to the extent
necessary to assure sound development of air transportation
system in the public interest, and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity. Thus, the CAB cannot afford to face
the possibility of monopoly throughout the industry should all
economic controls be removed, or taJce the chance on the reverse
occuring, ruinous competition, (2:811-816)
Since the air transportation industry, as opposed to the
modes of rail
.and motor, has been regulated almost from biirth,
monopolistic conditions have not historically occurred. Whether
or not this condition might eventuate is a chance that the CAB
cannot take, Thsre is, however, recent indications that the CAB
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is liberalizing route award policies. The Board has placed
special emphasis on new route proposals "by airlines which have
included innovative low fare plans. The Agency is also "beginning
to grant new routes to airlines on a "permissive" basis, that is,
an airline may come into the market when, and if, it chooses, and
to drop out of the market as freely. On these new routes,
back-up airlines are being named which could start flying should
the first carrier selected decide to forego the service, (13:17)
The C/lB cautions, however, that restraint is a must, and
that headlong efforts in this direction could lead to financial
difficulties in the long term for some carriers. Too many
uneconomical fares or routes could drive some carriers out of the
market, reduce competition, and eventually bring higher prices to
the consumer, (14:74-75) The CAB feels that regulatory change
is a must in order to prevent industry fina,ncial "feast or
famine," Pares will continue to rise, putting a damper on
traffic growth and the airlines will increasingly turn to the
federal government for financial aid.
E. REGULATORY AGENCIES
1. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
a. History
The ICC was a by-product of the first attempts by the
government to regulate commerce, specifically the railroads, as a
result of the Granger cases of the early 1870 »s. The Granger
50

laws in the 1870 *s and 80 *s created a transportation regtilatory
structure at the state level, but did little to stabilize control
across the nation. Mxmopolistic abuses by the railroads
continued and resulted in widespread publicity, thus creating
increased agitation by groups representing shipper and merchant
interests for federal control of railroads.
On April 3$ 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act became
effective, and still serves as the comer-stone for
transportation regulation in the United States, Much of the
substance of the Act was aimed at the prevention of monopoly
abuses and control of discriminatory abuses. It contained
regulation dealing with Reasonableness of Rates, Personal
Discrimination, Undue Preference, Long and Short Haul, Pooling,
Publication of Rates, and created an Interstate Commerce
Commission to administer these new regulations, (15:209-212)
The ICC originally consisted of five members, each
serving a six-year term, appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, The membership has expanded to
11 members and the term of office extended to seven years. The
make-up of the membership is bipartisan, and no more than six
members may be from the same political party. The ICC reports
directly to Congress, while the chairman may be called to report
directly to the President, Complaints may be submitted by
in;jured parties to the ICC either formally or informally.
In the early days of the ICC, the Commission was
authorized to order carriers to prepare reports and accounts, it
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could conduct investigations into carrier affairs, and issue
cease and desist orders. The ICC was empowered to determine
awards of damages caused iDy carrier violations, but there was no
penalty for failure to obey an ICC order. If a carrier did not
comply with a directive, the ICC*s only recourse was appeal to a
federal court. In 1896 and 1897, the Supreme Court ruled that
the ICC did not have authority to determine actual or maximum
rates for a carrier. Minimum rates were, however, within ICC
jurisdiction.
Much of the authority of the ICC has been restored in
the years since its early difficulties, and in many instances,
even broadened. The Rail Regulation Act of 1910-1920 restored
most of the ICC jurisdiction over rates and the Transportation
Act of 1920 strengthened their authority in this area while
endowing the Commission with control over ent2:y to the industry,
as well as abandonment of rail lines. The Act of 1920 also gave
the Commission control over the regulation of rail securities,
rail consolidations, sharing of terminals, car service rules,
and utilization of rail equipment during national emergencies.
(15:213-220)
The 1920 »s saw the tremendous grov/th of bus and truck
operations which emerged as strong competitors with the
railroads. This led to greater and greater pressure for control
of trucking as a hedge against further financial losses by the
rail industry. The depression of the early 30 »s created excess
capacity in all modes of transport with attendant discriminatory
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pricing and service practices "by the trucking industry since it
was not operating under the same regulatory controls as the
railroads. In 1935, the control of interstate motor carriage
was given to the ICC and was incorporated into the Interstate
Conmerce Act as Part II, and in 1940, its jurisdiction was
widened to include inland water carriers. Regulation of the
water carriers became Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act,
The ICC has never been empowered v;ith regulatory jurisdiction
over intrastate commerce, either by tmicking or rail except
when intrastate rates are determined to be so low relative to
interstate rates as to cause an undue burden on interstate
commerce, (15:254)
b. Strengths
The most important feature of the ICC as well as the
other federal regulatory agencies, is its independence. This
independence minimizes the likelihood of political interference,
it does not however, eliminate that interference. The Commission
exercises legislative, executive, and judicial powers, Wien
aidiiig in the enforcement of a statute, the ICC is acting in an
executive capacity, \^en determining reasonableness of a rate on
part shipments, it exercises judicial power, and when prescribing
a rate for the future, it acts in a legislative capacity,
(3:288-289)
The primary purpose of the ICC is to prevent
discrimination and to enforce equality of treatment by common
carriers for the pxirpose of providing consumer protection. The
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Connnission has had a Mstory filled with, political and judicial
setbacks and will, in all probability, continue along a rough and
rocky road depending upon the political, budgetary, and
legislative climate at the time. Regardless, the Commission, for
the most part, has attempted to judiciously and fairly carry out
its duties. There are some difficxilties under which the
Commission must labor and v/hich will probably not significantly
alter in the foreseeable future,
0. Weakness
The President appoints, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, the members of the ICC, and once appointed,
cannot be removed by him during the member's teim of office.
This does remove much of the "spoils of office" from the
appointment, but even so, camiot remove all sense of obligation
from a given appointee to the appointor. Members of office
selected by the President of the United States carry somewhat
more prestige than those of more mundane calling, and therefore
carry somewhat more of an obligation to the appointor. Obviously
then, questions have arisen from time to time concerning the
qualifications of the agency appointees being based on
professional or political reasons for appointment.
There is some criticism that the ICC has fallen under
the control of the industry that they regulate and have become
more concerned with protection of caxrier interests than consumer
welfare. It has been noted that following the expiration of a
term of office, many former regulators assume executive positions
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in tlie industries which they were, at one time, regoilating.
Whether this is a nataral evolution because the agency regulator,
during his term in office, came to know the industry and federal
regulatory policy very well and is therefore exceptionally v;ell
qualified to fill an industiy position and need, or is a reward
on the part of the industry for services rendered while serving
as an agency member, is debatable. Considering the current
financial difficulties of the rail industry, it would appear
that members of the ICC have not had the industry's financial
well-being uppermost v/hile serving with the agency. (15:289)
!Dhere is some evidence to suppoirfc a claim that the
ICC has been overly concerned with regulating and not
sufficiently concerned with promoting the rail and motor carrier
industry. Too much concern over rates, control of rates,
determination of rates, abandonment of non-profitable routes,
and merger policies, particularly with respect to the railroads
has led the industry to the point of financial collapse, The
railroads are qxiick to point out results of the ICC's past
financial constrictive policies by the fact that there were over
7,000 derailments nationwide in 1977, (16:12) because the
industry has not been allowed to raise rates which would provide
sufficient funds for proper maintenance and track replacement.
The ICC has been criticized for frustrating railroad
mergers by making them more difficult or for lessening their
vailue by forcing the inclusion of an entire marginal road in the
consolidated system planned by two or more roads. The Commission
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lias "been overly concerned with the preseirvation of seirvice, not
of companies or railroad systems, so says the industry. (17:15)
2. Civil Aeronautics Board
a. History
The Civil Aeronautics Authority was commissioned to
promote adequate, efficient, and economical air service and to
regulate air transportation. (8:98-99) It was established by
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 to provide for the regulation
of air carriers comparable to that provided for railroads and
motor carriers. The Act authorized the authority to regulate
safety, the construction, maintenance, and operation of federal
airways as well as the determination of compensation to be
received by the airlines for the transportation of mail.
The Authority was intended to be an independent
regulatory agency, and free from executive interference so far as
its quasi-legislative and judicial powers were concerned. The
Authority did, however, include the office of Administrator and
the Air Safety Board, which were responsible to the President.
(2:797-800)
The Civil Aeronautics Authority was reorganized in
1940, and changes included the abolishment of the Air Safety
Board whose functions were passed to the now designated Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Federal Aviation Act of 1958
created the Federal Aviation Agency (PAA) to assume the functions
of air safety regulations, while the CAB continued to perform the
56

responsibilities for accident investigation. So far as economic
regulation was concerned, the CAB continued as the regulatory
agency. Economic regulation is contained in Title IV of the
Pederal Aviation Act of 1958, and is generally patterned on the
system of railroads and motor carriers. (2:803)
"b. Strengths
The significant difference between the functions of
the ICC and those of the CAB is in the policy statements of the
two agencies. Therein lies the strength of the CAB, for an
examination of the CAB policy declaration makes it clear that
regulation of air transpoirfcation is not for the purpose of
hindering aviation development in the interest of older
transportation agencies:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and
duties under this Act, the Authority shall consider
the following • • • The encouragement and development
of an air transportation system properly adapted to
the present and futxire needs ... of the commerce of
the United States
. • . The promotion of adequate,
economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges ... The regulation of air commerce
in such a manner as to best promote its development
and safety, and the encouragement and development of
civil aeronautics. (2:805-806)
It is readily apparent from the declaration that the
CAB is charged with the provisions of the Act insofar as promoting
and regulating air transportation, whereas the ICC
responsibilities include only the regulation of rail, motor, and
water transportation. The inclusion of the responsibilities for
promotion of air transportation may account for much of the
differences in how the two agencies have interacted with the
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transport modes and why the air transport industry has made
significant strides in fiirthering their industry while continued
serious economical difficulties continue to plague other
transport modes, particularly the railroads,
c. V/eatoiesses
Outside of the same political inconsistencies which
can and do affect the ICC from time to time, the CAJB has been
criticized for awarding additional routes to existing carriers
instead of certificating new airlines. Further, the CAB has
periodically been criticized for certificating too much
competitive service, thus fostering overcapacity in the industry.
Be that as it may, there is not doubt that the CAB
has succeeded in advancing the air transport industry through
many of the economic hxirdles that the ICC has not been able to do
for the railroads. Part of the rationale for the CAB*s success
may be the total absence of both social and political stigma from
air lines promotion and development which, in fact, still clings
to the railroads as a result of past dubious practices of the
industry. Perhaps because of the CAB*s responsibilities for
promotion of the air transport industry, the Board members have a
different perspective than those of the ICC, Por whatever
reason, the Congress should review the Agency's policy




5# Federal Maritime Commission (gMC)
The PMC basically regulates carriers by water on the
high seas, therefore since this paper treats only domestic
transportation, any discussion of the functions, background, and
ptirposes of the IS^C will be excluded.
4-. Deuairbment of Trans-portation
a. History
GJhe federal Department of Transportation (DOT) was
established in 1967 » and its purpose is to coordinate and
effectuate administration of the transportation programs of the
federal goverment. It is responsible for:
• • • facilitating the development and improvement
of coordinated transportation service to be provided
by private enterprise ... to stimulate • • •
technological advances in transportation . • , to
develop and recommend to the President and Congress
for approval of national transportation policies • • •
(15:291)
The secretary of transportation is a Cabinet member
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. He reports to Congress. Dot has more than 70,000
full-time employees, and has in excess of 3,000 field officers.
(15:291)
DOT'S role in regulation of transportation is
basically limited to safety throxigh the exercise of the
responsibilities of the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal
Railroad Administration, and the Federal Highway Administration.
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3X)T«s interface with economic regulation of
transportation is primarily one of policy review, critique, and
recommendation. DOT dispenses federal fluids for transportation
projects, and funding research and development efforts relative
to the several modes of transportation. Through this funding
medium, DOT exercises an indirect influence between
administration of funding various projects and the administration
of the regulatory statutes,
h. Strengths
The federal government has historically displayed
inordinate interest in the means of transportation: waterways,
highways, airways, and railroads. The various modes were
perceived as separate, complete, and unrelated entities rather
than a continuous domestic transportation system. This is
evident hy the progression of regulatory agencies.
DOT has provided a means for the consolidation and
reorganization of dispersed transportation regulatory agencies,
insofar as safety is concerned, and it does provide an on-going
organization which could ultimately include all federal
regulatory and promotional functions including that of
coordinated, integrated, long-range transportation planning.
(5:446-455)
0. Weaknesses
Early regulatory initiatives of DOT suffered "becaiise
they were overly ambitious and Congress did not respond well in
the face of extensive regulatory change in a relatively short

time period. As a resiilt, DOT experienced difficulties in
selling regulatory proposals to Congress aad it took several
years for DOT to re-establish, its credibility.
Tlie Secretary is charged with the duty of developing
national transportation policies and for the overall direction of
the domestic transportation industry, and yet it cannot dictate
policy to the regulatoiry agencies. This dichotomy of
responsibility without authority has done much to water down the
effectiveness of DOT, and will continue to impact on the future
of the transpoirbation industry. The establishment of a single
regulatory agency with control over all modes of interstate
traiisportation would contribute tov/ard the development and
implementation of integrated transportation policies.
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V. THE CASE POR REGUIiATION
!• Economic versus Safety Needs
lEhere is almost universal agreement that regulation of
the transportation modes in the United States requires an
overhaul. Those within the industry feel that deregulation is
the only answer to their financial difficulties, and there is
considerable data v;hich substantiates this charge. Regulation
has increased prices and rates most probably because of the
lack of effective application of rates and pricing controls,
through the reqiiirement to carry non-profitable routes, through
long-term subsidation and vstrious other cost increasing
regulatory requirements. Perhaps the single most significant
contribution to the price and rate increases is the oft time
uneven, Tmplanned, and haphazard application of regulatoiy
requirements both between modes and within modes.
If past industry performance can be taken as an example
of how the industry performs in a non-regulated atmosphere, then
regulation is mandatory. The United States goveimment must
ensure that for the benefit of the public, access to all modes of
transportation remains a viable endowment. There is little
doubt there that regulation and only regulation will continue to
provide that access. Because of the intense competition which
would result in the long run from removal of all regulatory
constraints, some modes of transportation would eventually be
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priced out of existence, or at least to a siirvival level, a level
far below a profitable growth, minimum which, would suLlow for
plant and eq.uipment replacment, thus the removing of any benefit
to the using public.
Economic regulation, today, poses some considerable
problems to the industry. Rate regulation has not been as well
defined and as forward looking as it should have been. Changes
to the rate process are far overdue as is the process of
consideration of mergers, route abandonment, or development,
Entiy controls have, at times, been discriminatory in nature and
have fostered conflict between industry and goveamment. The
regulatory agencies themselves have appeared, at times, to be
capricious. (There is strong evidence that even with modes,
questionable regulatory practices have evolved such as now exists
with inland water carriers versus railroads. It does seem that
water carriers received a minimum of regulation, only
sufficient to keep the railroad industry from showing a blatant
case for mode discrimination.
Regulatory agencies are independent of outside influence
but do not operate in any coordinated manner with each other.
The ICC has been primarily interested only in the regulation of
the railroad, motor, and inland water carriers, while the CAB has
tended to be more forward looking in that it has promotional as
well as regulatory requirements with the air transportation
industry.
The public is entitled to safe, economical
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transportation. There appears to be a general acceptance that
some regulation will be required in the future to insure the
public receives such transportation. Economic regulation is in
desperate need of revision to bring it into the present and
provide for the future of the industry. It is doubtful that
economic deregulation will really work. Safety regulation is
a must, and will be a continuing requirement, although there is
strong evidence to suggest that the overa3J. safety programs are
in need of overhaiil, as are many of the requirements of mode
safety not applied at all, or only on an unequitable basis.
2. Problems
Regulation of the industry is a multi-faceted process
because of the constant manipulation by different and opposing
interest groups during the regulatory drafting and legislative
process. The goals of the public versus those of the carrier,
shipper and labor, are not always compatible and are cause for
considerable conflict. The carrier is motivated by profit, he
wants to eliminate excess capacity, excess labor, and any services
to a shipper which are not profitable, and he wants to be able to
raise rates whenever reasonable. Labor, on the other hand, wants
more workers, job sectirity, steady income, better working
conditions, and higher wages for the same or even less
productivity. The shipper wants more service, more choice between
modes, and firms at lower prices. The public wants sound
transportation, that is both economical and safe, it wants to

avoid monopolies, aad at the same time, to stimiilate competition.
With these groups in a constant process of pushing and
pulling the legislative system, there is little wonder that the
transportation industry and government have not been very
effective.
It cannot be disputed that each mode of transportation
"basically serves a specific transport need, for private industry
and national defense, and for this reason their survivability
is a must. Economic as well as safety regulations are the only
viable solutions to this survivability. It cannot be disputed,
also, that reform is needed within the current legislative,
application, and administration of transportation regulation.
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VI. THE CASE FOR DEREGULATIOIT
1. Needs
Economic regoilation has stifled the development of
transportation technology, Paiticiilarly the ICC has been overly
protective of the status quo and has not been very sympathetic
towards innovations which might benefit one mode at the expense
of another. This, along with the prospect of long costly
hearings v/ith the ICC, are frustrating to management, when if the
agency atmosphere were more amenable to new concepts, might
• consider investment in more research and development.
The regulatory agencies have been accused of sheltering
firms already in the field against new competition. Again, this
may be a preoccupation by the regulatory bodies with the status
quo. Certification policies, particularly with the ICC, have
come \mder attack on many occassions. The ICC has repeatedly
emphasized where an existing motor carrier has expended energy
and resources in developing new facilities to handle available
traffic, that carrier is entitled to protection against
competition. (8:188-189)
Current regulatory policies misallocate resources ;through
value-of-service rate structures. This process encourages a
cairrier to base his rates on the value of the goods transported,
rather than on the cost of transportation. Since a carrier
charges high rates to transport goods of high value, the shipper
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will not object since transportation represents a small
percentage of total costs and profits from the transportation
of high, value commodities allows the carrier to reduce rates on
goods of lower value. Por shippers of lower value goods,
transportation is a much more significant factor, therefore cmy
cost savings by transport mode is a beneficial consideration.
However, such rating structures misallocates resources because
instances have occurred whereby trucks and barges carried goods
for which railroads have the cost advantage and vice-versa.
Regulatory procediires can be resource costing to carriers
because of current requirements which mandate the manner in
which carriers may hatil certain commodities over certain routes.
The regulations have become so onerous as to cause carriers to
create huge amounts of unnecessary, empty, additional mileage
over circuitous routes and idle time. There is a real need to
broaden carrier certificates to allow carriers to carry more
goods greater distances.
Current regulation tends to stifle managerial efficiency
because it assumes many of the functions that management should
otherwise perform and does perform in nonregulated industries.
Since the regulatory agencies control the maximum and minimum
pricing policies, it leaves management without any authority
over its most potent competitive weapon. The ICC grants
operating priveledges to railroads, motor carriers, pipelines,
and barge lines. The CAB grants airline companies operating
permission. The regulatory agency, in effect, tells the .industry
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whom it must service, how, and in what quantity.
If the transportation modes are to survive, there is an
urgent need to provide a competitive area in which the industry
might operate. The public is entitled to a reliable
transportation service at reasonable and fair rates. The
government, therefore, must hold out to the transportation
industry the same priveledges and economic rights that are
extended to non-regulated industries within limits to insure
safe operation.
2. Problems
There is so much at stake in deregulation that the
removal of regulation must proceed cautiously. There are vast
amounts of resources invested in agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing which would be placed in jeopardy by resulting
changes in ciirrent transportation regulation. The su2r7ival of
some of these industries as well as the welfare of some
communities would be endangered as well.
The problem of public transportation demands must be
addressed when considering deregulation of the industry. For
reasons of national or regional development, or for social or
political reasons, transport systems and searvices are demanded
which must be supported in part by taxation or by some other
noncompetitive price system.
In any event, economic deregulation of the transportation
industry will be a difficult task at best, because of the
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spill-OYer into the general econoiny of the nation. Current and
past regulatoiy processes have created a multi-faceted economic
octopus with tentacles reaching into practically every industry.
Severing of one of those tentacles will have immediate impact on






lEhe government and the transportation industry can proceed as
it currently does. The process of pyramidizing regulation with
attendant spiral ing costs to both the industry and the government
will eventually lead to a crisis of serious proportions. The
public is, and will continue to "be, asked to support these
increasing costs for maintenance and construction of ways until
such time as the tax burden becomes too unwieldy. In any event,
the "do nothing" alternative has an impossible future. The
sooner government faces this fact, the sooner the public and
industry will benefit.
B. GOVERmiENT 0\VNERSHIP
If this policy were adopted, it would involve ownership and
operation of the transportation modes. Railroads of almost all
nations are owned and operated by the government, and in most
coimtries, the governments own the major airlines. (2:901)
One advantage of government ownership of the transportation
system, from the public view, is that the system can be operated
without regard to which mode is or is not self-supporting.
Another advantage of government ownership and operation of the
transportation modes is that the system can be planned as a
system, and the plans executed without waste and duplication
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inevitalDle when private ownership, unregulated and uncoordinated,
seeks its own individual goals.
This alternative has certain disadvantages such as those
associated with puhlic enterprises. Inefficiencies due to lack of
the competitive spirit, tendency toward overstaffing,
"bureaucratic politics in administrative appointments and hiring,
and political pressure groups seeking preferential treatment and
services, all militate against government ownership and
operation of the nation's transportation system. One last
consideration, which adds to the fact that government ownership
prohably will not occur, is the concept of a free enterprise
system. Government ownership is just not compatible with a free
enterprise system, at least in the collective public mind, and
in fact, all government owned railroads CTirrently lose money.
C. COMPIETE DEREGULATION
Advocates of this alternative state that deregulation of the
transportation industry would, as it does in nonregulated
industries, allow the "marketplace to dictate." The consumer,
making his desires known through the purchase of those
transportation services most beneficial to him, ultimately
decides what modes would survive. Proponents of deregulation
admit initial cataclysmic confusion but in the end, the public
would have a competitive process with the user paying all the




The difficxilty with this alternative is that it asstunes
too encompassing a definition of the concept of competition.
In the railroad industry, there are many commodities for which
motor or water transport are not suhstitutes, particnlarly for
longer hauls. The presumption being that competition is all
pervasive and extends equally to all modes as equal substitutes.
This is just not fact. Further, national as well as social
and political considerations mandate a transpoirb system which
is not strictly economical according to the standards of the
marketplace,
D. A])APTIVE REGULATION
There is little doubt that some regiilation of the trans-
portation system is a must for national as well as social and
political reasons. This does not mean that ciirrent restrictive
and limiting economic regulation need continue in its present
configuration. If the regulatory process could be developed
to take on the form of adapting to changes as they occur, such
a policy would involve the least risk of all other alternatives.
It would not bar deregulation in certain cases, nor bar the
imposition of additional controls if circumstances so dictate.
It would allow for the assumption of responsibility for pro-
viding transportation service at various governmental levels
if the need exists, and yet should take a position of actively
promoting the growth of the transportation industry. Such a
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regulatory adaptive process would avoid the extremes of other
alternatives and assist in the evolution of the system adjusting




A comprehensive review of available information reflects that
the drafters of transportation regulation have recognized that
over-regulation can be a serious detriment to a viable system.
It is the opinion of this writer over time, the regulatory-
process has become less and less restrictive in nature. Prom
the time of the Granger movement in 1870, culminating in the
first federal legislation of the rail carriers with the enactment
of the Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887, to the Transportation
Act of 1966, there has been a steady decline in the passage of
economically restrictive regulation.
Rail carriers are 100 percent regulated under Part I of the
Interstate Commerce Act, This is so, most likely, because of the
over-reaction by the states, courts, and finally, the federal
government in the 1870 *s and 1880*3 in response to misgtiided
I strong farmer pressure groups and because of the sometimes
practiced economic abuses of the rail carriers. The legislation
i
' was designed to prevent any such abuses in the future, but a
i
side effect prevented any innovation at all by the rail carriers.
The result is the present financial chaos of that industry. As
' with all regulation, once enacted, it becomes much more difficiilt
to rescind or modify.
By the time the motor carrier industry had grown sufficiently
' to require some form of regulation, considerable modifications
were made to the Interstate Commerce Act, Part II (motor carrier)

which were not as restrictive as that imposed on the rail
carrier industry. Today, only about 33 percent of the motor
cairier industry is regulated, and the industry enjoys far more
economical well-"being than the railroads. The water carriers
(Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act) are even less regulated
with only 7 percent of its industry subject to the Act.
There is some evidence to support the contention by the
rail carrier indust3:y that both motor and water carriers v/ere
regulated only to the present extent because of the lobbying
action by the railroads. If the railroad industry had not voiced
strenuous objections on the grounds of discrimination between
modes, it is entirely likely that motor and water carriers would
not be as economically regulated as they are today.
The regulation of the air carrier industry is an example of
an enlightened regulatory process. The industry is the youngest
of all modes; the legislators are more inclined to look to the
futxire, and the CAB has shovm a tendency to be willing to foster
changes when they are found to be economically restrictive. All
these forces have promoted the air carrier industry with the
results that the air line load-factors which only some few weeks
ago were averaging 46-48 percent, are now averaging 95-98 percent.
(18:20)
Ownership and maintenance of the way has not been equal among
or between modes. Railroads were initially responsible for
maintaining track and rail beds. Only recently has the federal
government come to realize that maintenance of the way has been
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an economic "burden not "borne by motor, v/ater, or th.e air carrier
industry. Construction and maintenance of highways, canals,
and airports and terminals have not "been accomplished "by the
respective industry. In any case, it does appear that financial
assistance in the construction and maintenance of the way has
been a progressive aid process by the federal government.
Energy factors may play a key role in the determination of
which transportation modes may, in the final analysis, continue
to survive. It is veiy doubtful, hov/ever, that aay single
transport mode will disappear from the system. Although one
mode may be more energy efficient than another, each is limited
in its own way. Por example, inland water carriers are far more
energy efficient per ton-mile than motor modes (500 versus 2,700
BTU per ton-mile), and yet it is inconceivable that the inland
water carrier will ever fill the role of the motor caxrier
industry. By the same token, for many bulk cargoes, the motor
carrier simply cannot compete with the v/ater or rail modes.
Depending upon availability and cost of future energy
supplies, pollution of the atmosphere and our cities, countryside
beautification, and even noise pollution, perhaps a viable
alternative may have to be developed, such as balloons.
Considerable research has been done in the past, and more is
currently being accomplished in this area to overcome certain
stability problems as well as inclement weather sensitivity,
but the prospect is exciting. The balloon landing pads can be
placed almost anywhere; there is no noise or air pollution, the
n/-

system requires no planning of additional highways and by-ways,
or airports, and the system *s capacity to move cargo is
excellent. Viewing some of our current traffic, rail, and
airport congestion difficulties, a noiseless, clean process
presented by a balloon transport system seems infinitely more
attractive. At least, it is worthy of additional research and
developments, for the rev/ards could be astronomical.
Each cuirent transport mode has its own inherent advantages
depending upon shipper needs, type of cargo, and speed of
delivery. The rail carriers are most advantageous for long-haul
shipments, and bulk cargoes; the motor carriers are ideally
suited to the short-haul, and door-to-door service. The water
carrier has the most economical cost for large tonnages and
long-haul, and the air carriers, of course, are particularly
advantageous for quick delivery. Each mode has recognized
disadvantages as well, but one fact predominates—each mode is
particularly suited to singular type of cargo, therefore each
must siirvive.
The transport problem today, and in the forseeable future, is
to promote the right economic development of each mode to
include coordinated services by two or more modes. Transportation
policy can no longer be aimed at initial economic development
of the industry, because the industry has reached maturity.
Policy must no longer be remedial in its outlook in developing
regulation based on past experience. It must be promotional in





Regulation must promote workable competition, V/here
regulation adversely impacts on the achievement of economy
and efficiency, it should be abolished. If the scope of
regulation is too broad or undefined, then it should be
narrov/ed. If regulation is req^LLred to meet nev; transport needs,
then it should be responsive to those needs. Lastly, where
regulation is perceived as debilitating and stifling to
industry management, to the public, or to the agencies of
regulation, then its purpose must be modified or altered to
acceptable levels.
The process of coordination of regulation on a national




The "do nothing" alternative v/ill become costlier to the
puhlic and more and more difficult to administer. This v/ill
mean larger and larger bureaucracies such as the ICC, CAB,
PMC, and DOT. The industry v/ill continue to suffer from lack
of overall policy guidelines as v/ell as unevenly applied regulatory
requirements. The prospect for solution to the transportation
system problems under this alternative is doomed to failure.
Government ovmership of the transport system is certainly
a real alternative. Almost every single nation, with the
exception of the U.S., ov/ns a part or all of its transportation
system, Ir/hether the government-ovvned systems v/ork because
of coordinated, efficient policies, or because the government
malces the system work is a moot point. The systems are working,
albiet at increased public expense. It is not a feasible
alteimative in the United States at this point in time and
probably v/ill not become a realistic alternative as long as
other meaiB of resolving the system difficulties are available.
Complete deregulation is not a viable alternative at this
time. Pirst, there are many commodities in the railroad carrier
industry for which motor transportation or transportation by
water is not a substitute. Secondly the motor carrier and air
csirriers cannot compete v/ith each other because each is suited
to different commodities and or passengers. Public demands for
some services are not economical in the literal sense and
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for social, political or national reasons are nevertheless
required. Purther, past industry performance has failed to
assure the government Idiat the system v/ill support the nation*
s
needs if left to its ovm devices. Lastly, the marketplace
cannot be the sole indicator of transport requirements when
it is determined that not all users have equal access to the
system.
The federal government and the transport industry must
cease comparing modes. This consistent need to compare one
mode against another has led to restrictive economic regulation,
"because the modes are each different and unique in their own
way. There is a need for regulation, but it should properly
fall somewhere between total regulation and lassiez fare.
The only forseeable alternative is that of "adaptive
regulation." Regulation must be forv^ard looking, and it must
plan for a changing transportation environment and provide
for a coordinated, reliable, economical and safe system to
meet the needs of the nation. The regulatory process must
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